Abstract: Though the explosion of cable television and talk-radio programming allows individuals to select opinionated media from only one side of the political spectrum, most Americans consume a mix of programming, with varying degrees of bias across the ideological spectrum. Research on partisan media typically evaluates the independent effects of likeminded, crosscutting and neutral exposure in isolation, yet the effects of media consumption likely depend on an individual's overall media diet in aggregate. The ambiguity of theoretical approaches regarding mixed media diets suggests the need for empirical research. One line of reasoning predicts that slanted diets will generate more extreme attitudes and greater participation than evenhanded diets, while a second line of reasoning predicts the opposite. We test the effects of media diet composition on issue attitudes and campaign participation using the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). To do so, we construct of novel measure of the relative balance of each respondent's media diet based on questions about their consumption of 73 different entertainment and news programs. Within-subjects and matching analyses indicate that slanted media diets increase campaign participation, but not issue polarization. This article provides a theoretical and empirical basis for future research on the political effects of real-world media consumption.
The recent proliferation of media sources provides individuals with more choice than ever before. Increased competition for audiences motivates targeted programming (both entertainment and news) that eschews norms of balanced presentation in favor of opinionated or satirical commentary by openly partisan hosts (Williams & Delli Carpini 2011; Groseclose & Milyo 2005; Mullainathan & Shleifer 2005) . These changes in the information environment allow citizens to select a media diet that contains more ideologically homogenous and extreme programming than was possible when network channels dominated the airwaves (Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011) . However, selective exposure to likeminded programming remains uneven and incomplete.
i Most current research on partisan media examines the independent effects of likeminded (favoring one's own side), crosscutting (favoring the other side), or neutral media exposure.
ii Scholars test the effects of exposure to one type of media while controlling for exposure to others. We theorize that the effect of media consumption may depend on the relative mix of likeminded, crosscutting and neutral media consumed, and not just by the amount of each independently. Although Americans now consume a mix of programming, with varying degrees of bias and from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, scholars have not yet examined the consequences of exposure to one-sided versus diverse perspectives in an individual's media diet
The effects of unbalanced as compared to balanced media diets are theoretically ambiguous. We identify one line of reasoning that predicts that exposure to an "echo chamber" of strident likeminded media voices polarizes and mobilizes while a more balanced exposure to opposing perspectives (whether in crosscutting partisan media or in neutral media) tempers political attitudes and action. However, a second line of reasoning predicts the exact opposite: exposure to conflicting views may be more polarizing and mobilizing than exposure to familiar arguments. Contact with the opposition through the media can increase extremity by inviting counterargument, intensifying in-/out-group sentiments and eliciting negative emotions. A media diet without conflicting arguments may be a less potent force for extremism and action.
Our research is designed to adjudicate between these diametrically opposed predictions about the effects of unified versus mixed media messages. We use public opinion data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to develop a single measure of the relative balance of each respondent's media diet based on questions about 73 different news and entertainment shows. This novel measure allows us to test the effects of media diet composition on issue attitudes and campaign participation.
Our fixed-effects and matching analyses show that more ideologically slanted media diets are associated with greater increases in participation over the course of the campaign than balanced media diets. People who consume a diet consisting primarily of likeminded news and entertainment programing become more involved in the political process than those who hear mostly muted calls to action from moderate mainstream broadcasts or receive mixed signals from both sides of the spectrum. We find no evidence that imbalanced exposure to strident partisan voices causes polarization of attitudes on prominent issues (the Iraq War, immigration, free trade). Our results suggest that one-sided partisan media consumption may mobilize without polarizing The next section of this article elaborates on the perspectives outlined above to develop hypotheses about the effects of media diet balance on attitudinal polarization and political participation. We then describe our measurement approach, data and research strategy. We present the results from fixed-effects regression analyses followed by the results of matching analyses, and conclude with a discussion of key findings from the research.
Effects of Homogenous versus Heterogeneous Media Diets
The main innovation of this article is to theorize about, and test, the effects of composite media diets rather than the effects of likeminded, neutral and crosscutting exposure in isolation.
We develop our own theories of the political effects of unified versus diverse consumption given the lack of scholarship on total media diet composition. To do so, we build off studies of the independent effects of the three types of media iii and analogous research on interpersonal contact, motivated reasoning, and social identity theory. These literatures suggest contradictory effects of exposure to unbalanced as compared to balanced media diets. The first view predicts that slanted diets will generate more extreme attitudes and greater participation than evenhanded diets, while the second predicts the opposite.
iv Effects on issue polarization
The first line of reasoning holds that exposure to an echo chamber of exclusively likeminded partisan media exacerbates partisan preferences while exposure to a mixture of arguments moderates them (Sunstein 2009; Garrett et al. 2014) . According to this perspective, unbalanced media diets should lead to greater attitude extremity than balanced ones.
Research on heterogeneous social networks and interpersonal discussions highlights how interactions with people who hold different views can foster mutual understanding, reevaluation of positions, and moderation (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Klofstad et al. 2013; Mutz 2006) , which dovetails with democratic theorists who reason that democracy is strengthened when citizens are exposed to myriad views (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989; Mill [1859 Mill [ ] 1999 Gutmann & Thompson 1996) . By this logic, exposure to competing policy arguments will encourage informed decisionmaking. Individuals with balanced diets are better able to distinguish facts from opinions and more cognizant of bias in likeminded sources. These individuals are persuaded by convincing arguments from the other side, and less susceptible to familiar arguments from their own side (Dilliplane 2011) . The net effect of exposure to diverse viewpoints, whether through exposure to neutral media that presents competing arguments within a single program (internal diversity) or to partisan media from competing parties (external diversity), is to moderate attitudes,.
While heterogeneous exposure is expected to moderate, this perspective suggests that homogeneous diets will reinforce and strengthen initial preferences. Partisan media outlets frame, spin, or slant coverage to support a particular perspective, highlighting favorable information while discrediting and denigrating alternative views, organizations and personalities (Jamieson & Cappella 2008) . Those who are only exposed to attitude-congruent media can amass evidence to justify their beliefs without hearing arguments to the contrary (Levendusky 2013; Jamieson & Cappella 2008; Sunstein 2009 ). The presentation of uncontested arguments may also be more convincing than these same arguments presented alongside critiques (Garrett et al. 2014 ).
According to this line of reasoning, consumption of only strident likeminded partisan media increases attitude extremity, especially relative to a more diversified diet.
Based on these arguments, we expect the following hypothesis to be true:
H1a: Exposure to unbalanced partisan media diets results in more extreme attitudes on key policy issues than exposure to balanced media diets.
The first line of reasoning (described above) assumes that individuals are open to opposing arguments and can be persuaded to change their minds, or at least temper convictions, based on new evidence (Conroy-Krutz and Moehler n.d. ; Feldman 2011; Levendusky 2013 ).
However, much of the literature on partisan media assumes that individuals are motivated by directional goals rather than accuracy goals. If individuals exposed to discordant views react defensively, then unbalanced exposure should lead to greater attitude extremity than balanced exposure. Thus, the second line of reasoning (described below) predicts the opposite of the first.
The theory of partisan-motivated reasoning posits that individuals seek to minimize cognitive dissonance by engaging in biased information processing (Taber and Lodge 2006) .
When presented with oppositional arguments, partisans counter-argue to discredit discordant perspectives and bolster their views. By mounting arguments in defense of their issue positions, partisans become more convinced of the probity of their own side (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006; Levendusky 2013) . Some partisans even seek out crosscutting media to act as a foil for their own beliefs (Garrett 2009 ). The juxtaposition of competing arguments in internally diverse programming can also strengthen initial preferences by highlighting differences between the two sides.
Furthermore, social identity theory suggests that individuals may envision themselves as members of a community of likeminded media personalities and viewers. Contact with spokespeople from the other party in crosscutting or neutral media may increase the salience of partisan identities, exacerbate in/out-group sentiments, stimulate anxiety, and fuel intolerance.
As a result, individuals with mixed media diets may reject candidates and policies perceived to be associated with the out-group in favor of the in-group Levendusky 2013 ). This effect may be especially pronounced when the out-group is denigrated and the in-group praised, as is common in partisan media (Jamieson & Cappella 2008) .
Theories of partisan motivated reasoning and social identity theory predict that a balanced media diet will be less polarizing than an imbalanced diet that evoke emotions and defensive reasoning. When individuals are primarily exposed to their own side (as is the case with most homogeneous diets) they react less strongly than when exposed to opposing perspectives in neutral media or a mixture of likeminded and crosscutting media. This reasoning suggests a hypothesis that directly contradicts the first:
H1b: Exposure to unbalanced partisan media diets results in less extreme attitudes on key policy issues than exposure to balanced media diets.
Effects on campaign participation
There are fewer studies about the effect of partisan media on participation than on attitudes. Although less extensive, the literature on partisan media and mobilization, and related bodies of work, lead to competing expectations about which media diets will generate greater participation.
The first perspective suggests that exposure to unified and outspoken partisan voices in likeminded media may mobilize citizens to participate in politics, whereas exposure to diverse should expect less participation when media consumption is mixed than when individuals are in the echo chamber of likeminded media. In addition, favorable contact with out-group members through the media could increase tolerance, enhance trust in opposition politicians, and reduce anxiety about the consequences of losing (Levendusky 2013) . Thus, individuals exposed to spokespeople for the other side may have less reason to actively defend their own side. Finally, audiences of likeminded media may be exposed to more emotional appeals to get involved on behalf of their candidate or cause, and provided with more information on how to get involved, than audiences of neutral or mixed programming (Jamieson & Cappella 2008 ).
This first perspective finds support from empirical studies of cross-pressuring through interpersonal communication, social network location, or socio-demographic characteristics.
Studies have found that homogenous social and attitudinal influences are associated with greater participation and cross-pressuring associated with less participation (Brader et al. 2014; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Klofstad et al. 2013; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Mutz 2006 Moreover, in-/out-group sentiments can become more salient with exposure to attacks from opposition media and individuals may increase participation to demonstrate that they are accepted members of their in-group of likeminded viewers and hosts.
In contrast, individuals who do not hear from activists from the other party may be more complacent. Absent this exposure, individuals may be unaware of the stakes and less fearful of the other side winning (Scheufele et al. 2004) . Finally, when individuals only hear from fellow partisans, they may have a distorted view of overall public opinion, and conclude that their party will win regardless of whether they personally get involved (Daniller et al. n.d.; ). Thus we might expect the following according to the second perspective:
H2b: Exposure to unbalanced partisan media diets results in less campaign participation than exposure to balanced media diets.
Our empirical analysis is designed to test these competing hypotheses about the effects of media diets on issue attitudes and campaign participation. 2. Use the coefficient estimates generated in Step 1 to calculate the predicted probability of preferring McCain for each respondent (based on media consumption) while suppressing the constant term generated in Step 1. xii This second step estimates the degree to which a person's media diet favors McCain.
Measures and Methods

This study uses data from the
3. Subtract the probability of preferring McCain from 1 to calculate the probability of preferring Obama.
4. Subtract the probability of preferring Obama from the predicted probability of preferring
McCain and take the absolute value to calculate the degree to which a respondent's media diet favors one candidate over the other.
xiii
The four-step process results in the MPS, which is bounded between 0 and 1. Individuals with an MPS close to 1 are those whose media diet strongly favored one candidate, indicating that they consumed media that was strongly partisan from one side of the ideological spectrum without any counter-attitudinal consumption. In contrast, people with values close to 0 had media diets that were balanced, consuming media that was neutral and/or equally represented both sides of the partisan spectrum. Given how we have constructed the measure, a respondent might have a low MPS because they watch internally diverse shows (neutral media which presents both sides of the ideological spectrum on the same program) or externally diverse shows (partisan media selected from both sides). A low MPS thus indicates that the individual is exposed to a cross-pressured media diet.
We repeated the four-step process initially used to generate MPS for Wave 2 to generate a new MPS during Wave 4. We make one change in calculating the MPS for Wave 4. In the first step, instead of generating a new set of coefficient estimates for each program using only Wave 4 data, we used the coefficient estimates for each program generated using Wave 2 data. For example, the predicted effect of watching Program X might be b=.80 according to the coefficients generated with data from the wave 2. In step 2, b=.80, which would then be multiplied by watching (1)/not watching (0) a program in Wave 4. The only thing that changes in our calculation of the MPS between Wave 2 and Wave 4 is whether or not a person watches
Program X (i.e., whether it is coded as "1" or "0") in the relevant wave. Therefore, change in a respondent's MPS between the waves results solely from changing media habits over time, rather than a change in the estimated indicators of the slant in each show.
MPS has several advantages for our purpose in this paper. First, it provides a single measure of the overall diversity of an individual's total media diet based on a continuous measure of partisan slant, rather than a categorical measure of left, neutral, and right. Second, we can include a large number of programs and incorporate different genres, including entertainment shows that may promote perspectives or highlight issues favoring one party.
Third, we do not have to discard independents or respondents whose partisanship cannot be identified. Fourth, the MPS allows comparisons over time (in this case between waves).
Dependent Variables: Issue Polarization and Campaign Participation
Our measure of issue polarization was generated from questions about four issues relevant to the 2008 election. Respondents were asked their views on the war in Iraq, a path to citizenship for illegal aliens, the security of border with Mexico, and free trade. xiv For each question, respondents selected from responses that spanned the conventional views on the issues, and were considered "polarized" on an issue if they chose an extreme response on either side of the spectrum. On average, respondents held more polarized opinions during the convention season (M=1.675; SD=1.118) than during the general election (M=1.626, SD=1.109), meaning that respondents became less extreme over time.
Campaign participation was measured using five items traditionally used to assess participation in elections. Respondents reported whether, in the past 12 months, they had (1) given money to a campaign; (2) worked or volunteered for a campaign; (3) persuaded others in favor of a candidate; (4) attended a political meeting, speech, or event; or (5) advertised their support for a candidate via buttons, stickers, or signs. The individual items were summed into a 5-point scale. On average, respondents reported that they had participated in one campaign activity during the convention season (M=.998; SD=1.214), which increased to an average of between one and two activities following the general election (M=1.445; SD=1.440).
Research Design
To improve causal inference and reduce the likelihood of spuriousness, we use two different methodologies. Subject fixed-effects analysis compares outcomes over time within an individual, while the matching analysis compares outcomes between similar individuals.
Subject Fixed-Effects Design
First, we used panel survey data to estimate subject fixed-effects models. Due to the difficulty of correctly implementing fixed-effects models using count data (Allison, 2009 ), we employed a linear model in which
where y is the outcome of interest, MPS it provides respondent i's media diet at Wave t, Total # of News Programsit provides the total number of news programs respondent i watched at Wave t, xv α is subject fixed effects, and u is an unobserved disturbance term. The benefit of these fixed-effects models is that they control for unobserved heterogeneity, thus ruling out concerns related to spuriousness (if the unobserved characteristics are time invariant). This is to say that some subjects may be more educated, wealthy, etc. than others, and fixed-effects models control for both observed and unobserved characteristics that remain stable over time. In essence, we compare subjects at a later time to themselves at an earlier time. Using this approach, β1 provides the within-subjects effect of the media partisanship score, indicating the effect of changes in media diet over time within individuals.
We face a common challenge of using observational data for causal inference: being unable to establish the direction of influence with certainty. Nonetheless, we designed our analysis such that the dependent variable was measured after the initial measure of the independent variable. Specifically, the independent variable MPS, was measured during Wave 2 (the primaries) and Wave 4 (the general election). The outcome variable issue polarization was measured during Wave 3 (the convention season) and Wave 4 (the general election), and campaign participation was measured during Wave 3 (the convention season) and Wave 5 (the post-election period). This lag design may help somewhat with establishing causal order.
Matching Design
As with any technique, regression models are not perfect. To examine the robustness of our findings, we also examine the effects of changes in MPS over the course of the survey when matching subjects on a set of covariates. Matching analyses reduce concerns that determinants of the subject's media diet (and thus of their MPS) also influence their political participation and issue polarization because we only compare subjects that are similar on a large set of observables Matching requires the definition of a binary treatment to separate the two groups. For the analyses described in the body of this paper we compare subjects that had below average MPS in Wave 5 (the "control") with subjects that had above average MPS in Wave 5 (the "treatment"), though results are consistent when we use different criteria for dividing our sample (see Appendices 8-9). Since respondents are matched based on their MPS at Wave 2, the matching analysis allows the comparison of otherwise similar respondents whose MPS diverged during the course of the campaign. As a robustness check, we use two different techniques for matching:
unrestricted Mahalanobis matching and Mahalanobis matching with caliper restriction.
xvi
The motivation for matching analysis is to generate control and treatment groups that are similar in all respects but their treatment status by matching treated to corresponding control observation. Comparison of the means tests for matched variables indicate that both strategies for matching successfully reduce differences between the control and treatment groups relative to the unmatched analysis, and that none of the group-wide differences are significantly different at the 5% level under Mahalanobis matching with a caliper restriction (see Appendix 7).
Once the matched groups are generated, we perform a simple comparison of means to determine whether being in the treatment group is associated with an increase in political participation and ideology relative to those in the 'control group'.
Results
Subject Fixed-Effects Regression Results
Table 1 below reports the coefficient estimates generated from Equation 1, which presents the fixed-effects models that control for between-subject differences in media diet. The first column of Table 1 shows the effects of homogenous and extreme media diets on issue polarization. The first hypothesis was that unbalanced diets of likeminded media would generate more extreme issue attitudes than balanced diets (H1a), while the second hypothesized the reverse effect (H1b). Neither hypothesis is supported by the data. The fixed-effects regression indicates that there is no significant effect of within-subject change in MPS on within-subject change in the extremity of issue attitudes across our two waves (b=-.000, SE=.066). It seems that homogenous and extreme media diets do not contribute to issue polarization.
[ Table 1 about here]
However, the results in column 2 of Table 1 Matching Analyses Results Table 2 shows the comparison of means with respect to issue polarization and campaign participation without matching, matching without a caliper restriction, and matching with a caliper restriction of 0.25 standard deviations of the Mahalanobis distance. The first row of Table 2 shows a simple comparison of means between individuals with different media habits, absent any matching. As might be expected, individuals who choose to watch homogenous and extreme media, on average, are more extreme and active than those with more diverse or neutral media diets. However, the differences reflected in these unmatched comparisons do not account for confounding factors and thus tell us nothing about whether media diet composition affects attitudes and behaviors.
[ Table 2 about here]
The next two rows in Table 2 show the key results of interest. When individuals are matched, there is no significant difference in the means for issue polarization between those with high and low MPS. The results are insignificant regardless of whether the matching is done with or without the caliper. These findings are consistent with those from the fixed-effects analysis; both indicate that MPS does not significantly affect issue polarization.
Most importantly, Table 2 also supports the findings of the subject fixed-effects analysis with regards to participation. Over the course of the campaign, increasing MPS from below the median to above the median results in greater participation regardless of whether a caliper is used. Overall, the results of the matching analyses provide additional support for the hypothesis that an unbalanced media diet energizes political participation (H2a).
We used multiple methods to account for threats to causal inference; however, our study is not without limitations. We cannot fully rule out the possibility of reverse causation without experimental data that would ensure temporal precedence. Although we chose analytical methods that minimize the likelihood of spuriousness-namely, by using fixed effects and matching-there are still potential threats to causal attribution. Specifically, our efforts to match on key variables are only as good as those variables that we have observed, and all fixed-effects models are vulnerable to the criticism that they do not control for spuriousness due to timevarying unobserved variables. Nonetheless, our claim that campaign participation is boosted by an increasingly unbalanced and extreme media diet is strengthened by the consistent evidence generated from multiple analytical methods.
Discussion
Research on partisan media typically evaluates the independent effects of likeminded, crosscutting and neutral exposure without considering how combination of media types in an individual's overall media diet might influence outcomes. We argue that the conventional approach-testing the effects of one kind of exposure while controlling for other types-is insufficient for understanding the current media environment where individuals consume a mix of programming with varying degrees of extremity. Empirical research on the topic is especially valuable because different scholarly traditions lead to contrasting predictions about the relative influence of unbalanced as opposed to balanced media diets on polarization and participation.
In this article we use a new measure to evaluate the effects of unbalanced media diets on issue attitudes and campaign participation. Our subject fixed-effects and matching analyses suggest that ideologically homogenous and extreme media diets increase campaign participation.
We find no empirical support for the claim that slanted media diets affect opinions on key issues.
Why might a diet of stanch partisan media from only one side of the political spectrum draw people into the political process but not alter preferences on key issues? It may be that issue attitudes are fairly stable and unlikely to be affected by media consumption over the course of an election campaign. This may be especially true given that the issues included in this analysis-the Iraq war, citizenship, boarder security, and free trade-are longstanding and often discussed topics. Respondents probably had strong priors on these issues long before the survey (Levendusky 2014) . It may be that a homogeneous diet of likeminded media increases other types of polarization (such as polarization on novel issues or affective polarization) and that more extreme attitudes along these other dimensions motivate action.
It is also possible that when faced with diverse perspectives, some individuals may polarize, while others may moderate their issue stances. A heterogeneous media diet may both motivate strong partisans to counter-argue against opposing messages and provide them with fodder with which to do so. In contrast, exposure to alternative perspectives in crosscutting or neutral media may persuade other individuals to reconsider and temper initial opinions. The estimated average effect of polarizing reactions among some individuals, and moderating reactions among others, would be consistent with our null result.
xvii Finally, unbalanced media diets may increase participation without affecting attitudes by pulling individuals into the political process with partisan appeals to get involved, and targeted information about how to do so. Elite mobilization through partisan media, rather than citizen motivations, may be responsible for the effect of slanted media diets on participation. Additional research is necessary to determine which explanations are most likely.
xviii
The analysis in this paper shows that, on average, exposure to loud and clear partisan media diets as compared to muted and mixed diets have the ability to mobilize without generating more extreme attitudes about the Iraq war, citizenship, boarder security, and free trade. These results may help assuage tension between the competing theories of deliberative and participatory democracy in the new media environment. However, ours is the first study of its kind, and it is too early to conclude that unbalanced media diets never exacerbate polarization.
This article proves a theoretical and empirical basis for future research on the effects of homogeneous versus heterogeneous media diets on additional outcomes of interest.
Endnotes
i Audience ratings show that network news programs still attract much larger audiences than even the most popular cable news shows Webster 2005) , and many cable news consumers report that they watch programming that ostensibly conflicts with their political views (Garrett 2014) .
ii Or alternatively scholars study the independent effects of: media with either a conservative or a liberal slant; a specific channel such as FOX, a single program, or media segment. In each case, the effect of one type of media is studied in isolation of other types. Garrett et. al. (2014) provide a notable exception to the analysis of independent effects. They test the interactive effect of likeminded and crosscutting exposure on affective polarization and social distance in the US and Israel (and find primarily null results). They take an important step in the direction of considering media diet composition writ large by acknowledging possible contingent effects of one type of media exposure on another. However, their interaction term does not reflect use of neutral media, the degree of slant in programs, nor the relative balance of overall media diets. iv Garrett et al. (2014) come to similar conflicting hypotheses when theorizing about the interactive effects of likeminded and crosscutting media on attitude polarization. Although they do not theorize about the effect of neutral media, nor the overall balance of a media diet, their reasoning with regard to contingent effects parallels our own.
v Although, others found limited or no effects (Leighley 1990; Nir 2005; Scheufele et al. 2006) .
vi Data was drawn from the second and fourth waves of the NAES survey because these were the periods during which respondents were asked detailed questions about their media consumption.
vii See Dilliplane et al. (2013) for a detailed description and validity tests of this approach to measuring media exposure. Forty of the shows were classified as "news," with 24 appearing on cable stations (e.g. FNC, MSNBC, and CNN) and 16 appearing on network news (ABC, NBC, CBS, and PBS). Eighteen programs were classified as non-news content, including dramas such as CSI and talk shows such as Oprah. Fifteen of the programs were political talk-radio shows.
Programs were included on the survey based on to their popularity according to Nielson ratings prior to the election.
viii Respondents could check off any number of programs that they wanted, with the average respondent reporting that they consumed between 10 and 11 programs during both the primaries and the general election (M=1.608; SD=7.064 during Wave 2; M=1.436; SD=6.819 during Wave 4). For a complete list of programs included, see Appendix 1.
ix Our measure of partisan media diets (MPS) is based on a measure of sociodemographic crosspressures developed by Brader, Tucker and Therriaut (2014) . content analyses of coverage tone (r=.63, n=16) and candidate visibility (-.76, n=19).
xi Our goal for this first step is calculate partial correlations between audience preferences and programs without implying causal influence one way or the other. We use logistical analysis because Preference for McCain is a dichotomous variable, which we coded as follows: First, we used vote intention to identify McCain and Obama supporters. If a respondent reported no preference, or that they did not know, we used party membership (e.g. a strong Democrat would be coded as favoring Obama) or the party they leaned towards (e.g. a person who leaned
Republican would be coded as favoring McCain).
xii We suppressed the constant term because we are interested in calculating the predicted slant of a given media diet, and not the leaning of a given respondent. In more technical terms, our reasons for including the constant in Step 1 but then suppressing it in Step 2 are as follows:
suppressing the constant in Step 2 prevents bias in our initial estimates for the effects of media due to general preference for Obama in the dataset, but including the constant in Step 1 avoids forcing our media variables to soak up the variation caused by this preference. In suppressing the constant term in Step 2, we deviate from the methodology used by Brader, Tucker, and Therriault (2014) . xiv The exact question wording can be found in the Supporting Information.
xv We controlled for the total number of shows watched to account for changes in the volume of a person's news consumption as well as the overall tenor of that media diet.
xvi Using a caliper drops treatment observations from the dataset if they are unable to be closely matched with a control observation. This reduces the sample size but increases the comparability of matched observations, strengthening the assumption of 'as-if' random assignment.
xvii Symmetrical polarizing and moderating effects among subpopulationsdo not necessitate symmetrical mobilizing and demobilizing effects among subpopulations. For example, slanted diets may increase attitude extremity and participation among one subsection of the population, and decrease attitude extremity, but not participation, among another subsection. Those whose attitudes are moderated by exposure to alternative arguments may not give up routinized activities such as voting.
xviii Of course null results could be due to measurement noise, bias, or range. For example, one potential cause of null results would be a ceiling effect on issue polarization, though that seems unlikely in this case. While those respondents in the top 1/3 of MPS scores show slightly more polarized attitudes, only 7.2% held extreme positions on all four issues. Note: * p<.05, two-sided tests. Entries are ordered logistical coefficient estimates with standard errors shown below in parentheses for within-subject comparisons. (1) and (2). As Levendusky (2011, p. 49) argues, finding a significant coefficient for the effect of change in MPS between Wave 2 and Wave 4 on the level of MPS in Wave 5 helps to rebut the argument that between-period differences are simply random noise stemming from measurement error. If this were true, change in MPS between Wave 2 and Wave 4 should have no predictive power to explain the level of MPS at Wave 5. The statistically significant β1 (p<.001) shown in Appendix 1 indicates that differences in the MPS reflect real change in media effects that persist over time. According to this coefficient estimate, people whose media diets become more (less) polarized and homogenous between the political primaries and general election receive higher (lower) MPS during the post-election period. The careful reader will note that we are using three waves of panel data in order to validate our measure, whereas we are using two waves of data to test the relationship between media diet and polarization or participation. This is because data regarding both self-reported ideology and participation were only available in two waves subsequent to the media exposure variables. To reiterate, the participation variables were gathered during Wave 3 and Wave 5, and the ideology variables were gathered during Wave 3 and Wave 4. Note: * p<.05, two-sided T-test with N-2 df. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the differences
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